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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 94-5707
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SHARLENE WILSON, PETITIONER v. ARKANSAS
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
arkansas
[May 22, 1995]

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
  At the time of the framing, the common law of search
and seizure recognized a law enforcement officer's
authority to break open the doors of a dwelling, but
generally indicated that he first ought to announce his
presence and authority.  In this case, we hold that this
common-law -knock and announce- principle forms a
part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment.

                            I
  During November and December 1992, petitioner
Sharlene Wilson made a series of narcotics sales to an
informant acting at the direction of the Arkansas State
Police.  In late November, the informant purchased
marijuana and methamphetamine at the home that
petitioner shared with Bryson Jacobs.  On December 30,
the informant telephoned petitioner at her home and
arranged to meet her at a local store to buy some
marijuana.  According to testimony presented below,
petitioner produced a semiautomatic pistol at this
meeting and waved it in the informant's face, threaten-
ing to kill her if she turned out to be working for the
police.  Petitioner then sold the informant a bag of
marijuana.
  The next day, police officers applied for and obtained
warrants to search petitioner's home and to arrest both
petitioner and Jacobs.  Affidavits filed in support of the
warrants set forth the details of the narcotics transac-
tions and stated that Jacobs had previously been
convicted of arson and firebombing.  The search was
conducted later that afternoon.  Police officers found the
main door to petitioner's home open.  While opening an
unlocked screen door and entering the residence, they
identified themselves as police officers and stated that
they had a warrant.  Once inside the home, the officers
seized marijuana, methamphetamine, valium, narcotics
paraphernalia, a gun, and ammunition.  They also found
petitioner in the bathroom, flushing marijuana down the
toilet.  Petitioner and Jacobs were arrested and charged
with delivery of marijuana, delivery of methamphet-
amine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession
of marijuana.
  Before trial, petitioner filed a motion to suppress the
evidence seized during the search.  Petitioner asserted
that the search was invalid on various grounds, includ-
ing that the officers had failed to -knock and announce-
before entering her home.  The trial court summarily
denied the suppression motion.  After a jury trial,
petitioner was convicted of all charges and sentenced to
32 years in prison.
  The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's
conviction on appeal.  317 Ark. 548, 878 S. W. 2d 755
(1994).  The court noted that -the officers entered the
home while they were identifying themselves,- but it
rejected petitioner's argument that -the Fourth Amend-
ment requires officers to knock and announce prior to
entering the residence.-  Id., at 553, 878 S. W. 2d, at
758 (emphasis added).  Finding -no authority for
[petitioner's] theory that the knock and announce princi-
ple is required by the Fourth Amendment,- the court
concluded that neither Arkansas law nor the Fourth
Amendment required suppression of the evidence.  Ibid.
  We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
lower courts as to whether the common-law knock-and-
announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness inquiry.  513 U. S. ___ (1995).  We
hold that it does, and accordingly reverse and remand.

                           II
  The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects
-[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.-  In evaluating the scope of this
right, we have looked to the traditional protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by
the common law at the time of the framing.  See
California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 624 (1991);
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418-420 (1976);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149 (1925).
-Although the underlying command of the Fourth
Amendment is always that searches and seizures be
reasonable,- New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 337
(1985), our effort to give content to this term may be
guided by the meaning ascribed to it by the Framers of
the Amendment.  An examination of the common law of
search and seizure leaves no doubt that the reason-
ableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part
on whether law enforcement officers announced their
presence and authority prior to entering.
  Although the common law generally protected a man's
house as -his castle of defence and asylum,- 3 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *288 (hereinafter Blackstone),
common-law courts long have held that -when the King
is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break
the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other
execution of the K[ing]'s process, if otherwise he cannot
enter.-  Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 194, 195 (K. B. 1603).  To this rule, however,
common-law courts appended an important qualification:
-But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the
cause of his coming, and to make request to open
doors . . . , for the law without a default in the
owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any
house (which is for the habitation and safety of
man) by which great damage and inconvenience
might ensue to the party, when no default is in him;
for perhaps he did not know of the process, of
which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he
would obey it . . . .-  Ibid., 77 Eng. Rep., at
195-196.
See also Case of Richard Curtis, Fost. 135, 137, 168
Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (Crown 1757) (-[N]o precise form of
words is required in a case of this kind.  It is sufficient
that the party hath notice, that the officer cometh not
as a mere trespasser, but claiming to act under a proper
authority . . .-); Lee v. Gansell, Lofft 374, 381-382, 98
Eng. Rep. 700, 705 (K. B. 1774) (-[A]s to the outer door,
the law is now clearly taken- that it is privileged; but
the door may be broken -when the due notification and
demand has been made and refused-).
  Several prominent founding-era commentators agreed
on this basic principle.  According to Sir Matthew Hale,
the -constant practice- at common law was that -the
officer may break open the door, if he be sure the
offender is there, if after acquainting them of the
business, and demanding the prisoner, he refuses to
open the door.-  See 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown
*582.  William Hawkins propounded a similar principle:
-the law doth never allow- an officer to break open the
door of a dwelling -but in cases of necessity,- that is,
unless he -first signify to those in the house the cause
of his coming, and request them to give him admit-
tance.-  2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 14, 1,
p. 138 (6th ed. 1787).  Sir William Blackstone stated
simply that the sheriff may -justify breaking open doors,
if the possession be not quietly delivered.-  3 Blackstone
*412.
  The common-law knock-and-announce principle was
woven quickly into the fabric of early American law.
Most of the States that ratified the Fourth Amendment
had enacted constitutional provisions or statutes gener-
ally incorporating English common law, see, e.g., N. J.
Const. of 1776, 22, in 5 Federal and State Constitu-
tions 2598 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (-[T]he common law of
England . . . shall still remain in force, until [it] shall
be altered by a future law of the Legislature-); N. Y.
Const. of 1777, Art. 35, in id., at 2635 (-[S]uch parts of
the common law of England . . . as . . . did form the
law of [New York on April 19, 1775] shall be and con-
tinue the law of this State, subject to such alterations
and provisions as the legislature of this State shall,
from time to time, make concerning the same-); Ordi-
nances of May 1776, ch. 5, 6, in 9 Statutes at Large of
Virginia 127 (W. Hening ed. 1821) (-[T]he common law
of England . . . shall be the rule of decision, and shall
be considered as in full force, until the same shall be
altered by the legislative power of this colony-), and a
few States had enacted statutes specifically embracing
the common-law view that the breaking of the door of a
dwelling was permitted once admittance was refused,
see, e.g., Act of Nov. 8, 1782, ch. 15, -6, in Acts and
Laws of Massachusetts 193 (1782); Act of Apr. 13, 1782,
ch. 39, 3, in 1 Laws of the State of New York 480
(1886); Act of June 24, 1782, ch. 317, 18, in Acts of the
General Assembly of New-Jersey (1784) (reprinted in
The First Laws of the State of New Jersey 293-294 (J.
Cushing comp. 1981)); Act of Dec. 23, 1780, ch. 925, 5,
in 10 Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 255 (J. Mitchell
& H. Flanders comp. 1904).  Early American courts
similarly embraced the common-law knock-and-announce
principle.  See, e.g., Walker v. Fox, 32 Ky. 404, 405
(1834); Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186, 189 (1846);
Howe v. Butterfield, 58 Mass. 302, 305 (1849).  See
generally Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Un-
lawful Entry, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499, 504-508 (1964)
(collecting cases).
  Our own cases have acknowledged that the common-
law principle of announcement is -embedded in Anglo-
American law,- Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301,
313 (1958), but we have never squarely held that this
principle is an element of the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment.  We now so hold.  Giv-
en the longstanding common-law endorsement of the
practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the
method of an officer's entry into a dwelling was among
the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonable-
ness of a search or seizure.  Contrary to the decision
below, we hold that in some circumstances an officer's
unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
  This is not to say, of course, that every entry must be
preceded by an announcement.  The Fourth Amend-
ment's flexible requirement of reasonableness should not
be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that
ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.  As
even petitioner concedes, the common-law principle of
announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule
requiring announcement under all circumstances.  See
Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 38 (1963) (plurality
opinion) (-[I]t has been recognized from the early com-
mon law that . . . breaking is permissible in executing
an arrest under certain circumstances-); see also, e.g.,
White & Wiltsheire, 2 Rolle 137, ___, 81 Eng. Rep. 709,
710 (K. B. 1619) (upholding the sheriff's breaking of the
door of the plaintiff's dwelling after the sheriff's bailiffs
had been imprisoned in plaintiff's dwelling while they
attempted an earlier execution of the seizure); Pugh v.
Griffith, 7 Ad. & E. 827, 840-841, 112 Eng. Rep. 681,
686 (K. B. 1838) (holding that -the necessity of a de-
mand . . . is obviated, because there was nobody on
whom a demand could be made- and noting that White
& Wiltsheire leaves open the possibility that there may
be -other occasions where the outer door may be bro-
ken- without prior demand).
  Indeed, at the time of the framing, the common-law
admonition that an officer -ought to signify the cause of
his coming,- Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep., at 91b, 77
Eng. Rep., at 195, had not been extended conclusively to
the context of felony arrests.  See Blakey, supra, at 503
(-The full scope of the application of the rule in criminal
cases . . . was never judicially settled-); Launock v.
Brown, 2 B. & Ald. 592, 593, 106 Eng. Rep. 482, 483
(K. B. 1819) (-It is not at present necessary for us to
decide how far, in the case of a person charged with
felony, it would be necessary to make a previous de-
mand of admittance before you could justify breaking
open the outer door of his house-); W. Murfree, Law of
Sheriffs and Other Ministerial Officers 1163, p. 631
(1st ed. 1884) (-[A]lthough there has been some doubt
on the question, the better opinion seems to be that, in
cases of felony, no demand of admittance is necessary,
especially as, in many cases, the delay incident to it
would enable the prisoner to escape-).  The common-law
principle gradually was applied to cases involving felo-
nies, but at the same time the courts continued to
recognize that under certain circumstances the presump-
tion in favor of announcement necessarily would give
way to contrary considerations.
  Thus, because the common-law rule was justified in
part by the belief that announcement generally would
avoid -the destruction or breaking of any house . . . by
which great damage and inconvenience might ensue,-
Semayne's Case, supra, at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep., at 196,
courts acknowledged that the presumption in favor of
announcement would yield under circumstances present-
ing a threat of physical violence.  See, e.g., Read v.
Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822) (plaintiff who -had re-
solved . . . to resist even to the shedding of blood . . .
was not within the reason and spirit of the rule requir-
ing notice-); Mahomed v. The Queen, 4 Moore 239, 247,
13 Eng. Rep. 293, 296 (P. C. 1843) (-While he was
firing pistols at them, were they to knock at the door,
and to ask him to be pleased to open it for them?  The
law in its wisdom only requires this ceremony to be
observed when it possibly may be attended with some
advantage, and may render the breaking open of the
outer door unnecessary-).  Similarly, courts held that an
officer may dispense with announcement in cases where
a prisoner escapes from him and retreats to his dwell-
ing.  See, e.g., ibid.; Allen v. Martin, 10 Wend. 300, 304
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).  Proof of -demand and refusal-
was deemed unnecessary in such cases because it would
be a -senseless ceremony- to require an officer in pur-
suit of a recently escaped arrestee to make an an-
nouncement prior to breaking the door to retake him.
Id., at 304.  Finally, courts have indicated that unan-
nounced entry may be justified where police officers
have reason to believe that evidence would likely be
destroyed if advance notice were given.  See Ker, 374
U. S., at 40-41 (plurality opinion); People v. Maddox, 46
Cal. 2d 301, 305-306, 294 P. 2d 6, 9 (1956).
  We need not attempt a comprehensive catalog of the
relevant countervailing factors here.  For now, we leave
to the lower courts the task of determining the circum-
stances under which an unannounced entry is reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment.  We simply hold
that although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be
constitutionally defective if police officers enter without
prior announcement, law enforcement interests may also
establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.

                           III
  Respondent contends that the judgment below should
be affirmed because the unannounced entry in this case
was justified for two reasons.  First, respondent argues
that police officers reasonably believed that a prior
announcement would have placed them in peril, given
their knowledge that petitioner had threatened a gov-
ernment informant with a semiautomatic weapon and
that Mr. Jacobs had previously been convicted of arson
and firebombing.  Second, respondent suggests that
prior announcement would have produced an unreason-
able risk that petitioner would destroy easily disposable
narcotics evidence.
  These considerations may well provide the necessary
justification for the unannounced entry in this case.
Because the Arkansas Supreme Court did not address
their sufficiency, however, we remand to allow the state
courts to make any necessary findings of fact and to
make the determination of reasonableness in the first
instance.  The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

                                      It is so ordered.